[dns-operations] summary of recent vulnerabilities in DNS security.
haya.shulman at gmail.com
Tue Oct 22 18:41:50 UTC 2013
I am not sure what you mean by `official OARC channels`, I forwarded my
communication on this issue, with porttest operators, to you a month or so
ago. Maybe these were not official channels, but I have not contacted OARC
otherwise, via a different channel.
Can you please advise how to contact OARC through official channels?
On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 7:53 PM, Keith Mitchell <keith at dns-oarc.net> wrote:
> On 10/22/2013 10:52 AM, Haya Shulman wrote:
> >> Disclosing such potential vulnerabilities remains valuable work,
> >> but I think careful consideration needs to be applied to the
> >> engineering economics of the best operational-world mitigation
> >> approaches.
> > @/Keith Mitchell/
> (My head is *really* hurting from this quotation formatting..)-:
> (re-wrapping and indenting to list conventions...)
> > I do not advocate to deploy these or other countermeasures. Above
> > any doubt you are in the best position to decide which
> > countermeasures to deploy.
> Not really, OARC does not operate production service-providing
> infrastructure except to support a membership organization, most of our
> infrastructure is dedicated to data-gathering/testbed/research purposes.
> So I defer to *real* DNS infrastructure operators and implementors on
> any such judgments.
> > The situation with DNS checkers is different from deployment of port
> > randomisation. DNS checkers is a very important service to the
> > community and the efforts that their operators took to make them
> > available is very valuable. However, an illusion of security is more
> > dangerous than not being protected at all (in the later case one is
> > aware that he is not protected and may be attacked).
> Fair enough.
> > I admit that I do not know what economic effort is required to patch
> > DNS checkers which report per-destination ports, recommended in
> > [RFC6056], as secure
> Well, more than we've been able to dedicate in the past month or so. I'm
> trying to get an estimate of this from those best placed to do the
> actual work.
> > but I suggested a fix to this vulnerability some time ago, that
> > should be fairly simple to implement;
> Yes, but as I explained privately previously, there is no record of this
> correspondence through official OARC channels - I did request you
> re-send, but I don't have a copy of it.
> > the problem with the porttest checker is that each IP address of the
> > checker system receives a single query from the tested resolver, and
> > so to each such IP address a random port is selected. But, if more
> > than a single query were sent to each checker IP during the test,
> > then the predictable sequence would be easily identified.
> Thank you for this clarification - any further points you have about the
> best way to implement the fix to this would be welcome, but are likely
> best taken off-list.
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