[dns-operations] REMINDER Re: Call for Participation -- ICANN DNSSEC Workshop at ICANN 52

Julie Hedlund julie.hedlund at icann.org
Wed Nov 26 14:52:24 UTC 2014

Call for Participation -- ICANN DNSSEC Workshop at ICANN 52 in Singapore
The DNSSEC Deployment Initiative and the Internet Society Deploy360
Programme, in cooperation with the ICANN Security and Stability Advisory
Committee (SSAC), are planning a DNSSEC Workshop at the ICANN 52 meeting on
11 February 2015 in Singapore.  The DNSSEC Workshop has been a part of ICANN
meetings for several years and has provided a forum for both experienced and
new people to meet, present and discuss current and future DNSSEC
deployments.  For reference, the most recent session was held at the ICANN
meeting in Los Angeles on 15 October 2014. The presentations and transcripts
are available at: http://la51.icann.org/en/schedule/wed-dnssec.
We are seeking presentations on the following topics:
1.  DNSSEC activities in Asia
For this panel we are seeking participation from those who have been
involved in DNSSEC deployment in Asia and also from those who have not
deployed DNSSEC but who have a keen interest in the challenges and benefits
of deployment.  In particular, we will consider the following questions:
What can DNSSEC do for you? What doesn't it do?  What are the internal
tradeoffs to implementing DNSSEC? What did you learn in your deployment of
DNSSEC?  We are interested in presentations from both people involved with
the signing of domains and people involved with the deployment of
DNSSEC-validating DNS resolvers.
2.  Potential impacts of Root Key Rollover
Given many concerns about the need to do a Root Key Rollover, we would like
to bring together a panel of people who can talk about what the potential
impacts may be to ISPs, equipment providers and end users, and also what can
be done to potentially mitigate those issues. In particular, we are seeking
participation from vendors, ISPs, and the community that will be affected by
distribution of new root keys.  We would like to be able to offer
suggestions out of this panel to the wider technical community.  If you have
a specific concern about the Root Key Rollover, or believe you have a method
or solution to help address impacts, we would like to hear from you.
3.  New gTLD registries and administrators implementing DNSSEC
With the launch of the new gTLDs, we are interested in hearing from
registries and operators of new gTLDs about what systems and processes they
have implemented to support DNSSEC.  As more gTLDs are launched, is there
DNSSEC-related information that can be shared to help those launches go

4.  Guidance for Registrars in supporting DNSSEC
The 2013 Registrar Accreditation Agreement (RAA) for registrars and
resellers requires them to support DNSSEC from  January 1, 2014. We are
seeking presentations discussing:
* What are the specific technical requirements of the RAA and how can
registrars meet those requirements?
* What tools and systems are available for registrars that include DNSSEC
* What information do registrars need to provide to resellers and ultimately
We are particularly interested in hearing from registrars who have signed
the 2013 RAA and have either already implemented DNSSEC support or have a
plan for doing so. 

5.  APIs between the Registrars and DNS hosting operators
One specific area that has been identified as needing focus is the
communication between registrars and DNS hosting operators, specifically
when these functions are provided by different entities.  Currently, the
communication, such as the transfer of a DS record, often occurs by way of
the domain name holder copying and pasting information from one web
interface to another. How can this be automated?  We would welcome
presentations by either registrars or DNS hosting operators who have
implemented APIs for the communication of DNSSEC information, or from people
with ideas around how such APIs could be constructed.

6.  Implementing DNSSEC validation at Internet Service Providers (ISPs)

Internet Service Providers (ISPs) play a critical role by enabling DNSSEC
validation for the caching DNS resolvers used by their customers.  We have
now seen massive rollouts of DNSSEC validation within large North American
ISPs and at ISPs around the world.  We are interested in presentations on
topics such as: 
* What does an ISP need to do to prepare its network for implementing DNSSEC
* How does an ISP need to prepare its support staff and technical staff for
the rollout of DNSSEC validation?
* What measurements are available about the degree of DNSSEC validation
currently deployed?
* What tools are available to help an ISP deploy DNSSEC validation?
* What are the practical server-sizing impacts of enabling DNSSEC validation
on ISP DNS Resolvers (ex. cost, memory, CPU, bandwidth, technical support,

7. The operational realities of running DNSSEC
Now that DNSSEC has become an operational norm for many registries,
registrars, and ISPs, what have we learned about how we manage DNSSEC? What
is the best practice around key rollovers? How often do you review your
disaster recovery procedures? Is there operational familiarity within your
customer support teams? What operational statistics have we gathered about
DNSSEC? Are there experiences being documented in the form of best
practices, or something similar, for transfer of signed zones?
8.  DNSSEC automation
For DNSSEC to reach massive deployment levels it is clear that a higher
level of automation is required than is currently available. Topics for
which we would like to see presentations include:
* What tools, systems and services are available to help automate DNSSEC key
* Can you provide an analysis of current tools/services and identify gaps?
* Where are the best opportunities for automation within DNSSEC signing and
validation processes?
* What are the costs and benefits of different approaches to automation?
9.  When unexpected DNSSEC events occur
What have we learned from some of the operational outages that we have seen
over the past 18 months? Are there lessons that we can pass on to those just
about to implement DNSSEC? How do you manage dissemination of information
about the outage? What have you learned about communications planning? Do
you have a route to ISPs and registrars? How do you liaise with your CERT
10.  DANE and DNSSEC applications
There is strong interest for DANE usage within web transactions as well as
for securing email and Voice-over-IP (VoIP). We are seeking presentations on
topics such as:
* What are some of the new and innovative uses of DANE and other DNSSEC
applications in new areas or industries?
* What tools and services are now available that can support DANE usage?
* How soon could DANE and other DNSSEC applications become a deployable
* How can the industry use DANE and other DNSSEC applications as a mechanism
for creating a more secure Internet?
We would be particularly interested in any live demonstrations of DNSSEC /
DANE applications and services.  For example, a demonstration of the actual
process of setting up a site with a certificate stored in a TLSA record that
correctly validates would be welcome.  Demonstrations of new tools that make
the setup of DNSSEC or DANE more automated would also be welcome.

11. DANE / DNSSEC as a way to secure email
The DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) protocol is an
exciting development where DNSSEC can be used to provide a strong additional
trust layer for traditional SSL/TLS certificates. We are both pleased and
intrigued by the growing usage of DANE and DNSSEC as a means of providing
added security for email. Multiple email servers have added support for DANE
records to secure TLS/SSL connections. Some email providers are marketing
DNSSEC/DANE support. We would like to have a panel at ICANN 51 focusing on
this particular usage of DANE. Are you a developer of an email server or
client supporting DANE?  Do you provide DANE / DNSSEC support in your email
service? Can you provide a brief case study of what you have done to
implement DANE / DNSSEC?  Can you talk about any lessons you learned in the

12.  DNSSEC and DANE in the enterprise
Enterprises can play a critical role in both providing DNSSEC validation to
their internal networks and also through signing of the domains owned by the
enterprise. We are seeking presentations from enterprises that have
implemented DNSSEC on validation and/or signing processes and can address
questions such as:
* What are the benefits to enterprises of rolling out DNSSEC validation? And
how do they do so?
* What are the challenges to deployment for these organizations and how
could DANE and other DNSSEC applications address those challenges?
* How should an enterprise best prepare its IT staff and network to
implement DNSSEC?
* What tools and systems are available to assist enterprises in the
deployment of DNSSEC?
* How can the DANE protocol be used within an enterprise to bring a higher
level of security to transactions using SSL/TLS certificates?
13. Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) use cases and innovation
We are interested in demonstrations of HSMs, presentations of HSM-related
innovations and real world use cases of HSMs and key management.
In addition, we welcome suggestions for additional topics.
If you are interested in participating, please send a brief (1-2 sentence)
description of your proposed presentation to dnssec-
<mailto:dnssec-singapore at isoc.org> singapore at isoc.org
<mailto:dnssec-singapore at isoc.org>  by **Wednesday, 10 December 2014
(deadline extended by one week)**
We hope that you can join us.
Thank you,
Julie Hedlund
On behalf of the DNSSEC Workshop Program Committee:
Mark Elkins, DNS/ZACR
Cath Goulding, Nominet UK
Jean Robert Hountomey, AfricaCERT
Jacques Latour, .CA
Xiaodong Lee, CNNIC
Luciano Minuchin, NIC.AR
Russ Mundy, Parsons
Ondřej Surý, CZ.NIC
Yoshiro Yoneya, JPRS
Dan York, Internet Society

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