[dns-operations] responding to spoofed ANY queries

Matthew Ghali mghali at snark.net
Thu Jan 10 17:39:37 UTC 2013

So if I understand correctly, the solution you are advocating is to only answer non-spoofed queries?

On Jan 10, 2013, at 7:23 AM, Jim Reid <jim at rfc1035.com> wrote:

> I agree: provided we're talking about responding to queries from valid recursors. However we're not. The context is spoofed queries. [See above.] Responding to these is bad because (a) it chews your bandwidth and CPU; (b) the replies don't go to the actual source that generated the queries; (c) the destination of those responses doesn't want or need that inbound traffic. This is why we agree RRL helps to reduce the damage from spoofed ANY flood attacks.

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