[dns-operations] responding to spoofed ANY queries

Jim Reid jim at rfc1035.com
Thu Jan 10 15:23:48 UTC 2013

On 10 Jan 2013, at 15:00, Paul Wouters <paul at cypherpunks.ca> wrote:

> On Thu, 10 Jan 2013, Jim Reid wrote:
>> IMO, responding to these spoofed queries is a Bad Idea.
> Not responding is worse.
> - valid recursors will just retry
> - valid recursors might conclude the auth server is slow/bad/unreachable and avoid it for legitimate queries as well.

I agree: provided we're talking about responding to queries from valid recursors. However we're not. The context is spoofed queries. [See above.] Responding to these is bad because (a) it chews your bandwidth and CPU; (b) the replies don't go to the actual source that generated the queries; (c) the destination of those responses doesn't want or need that inbound traffic. This is why we agree RRL helps to reduce the damage from spoofed ANY flood attacks.

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