[dns-operations] Implementation of negative trust anchors?

Paul Vixie paul at redbarn.org
Thu Aug 22 22:25:55 UTC 2013



Paul Hoffman wrote:
> On Aug 22, 2013, at 2:47 PM, David Conrad <drc at virtualized.org> wrote:
>
>> A resolver operator deploying an NTA is making an assertion that data behind a name is safe despite protocol indications that is may not be.
>
> Where is that stated? I ask, because it would seem that a better description would be that they are asserting that the data behind a name is unprotected by DNSSSEC.

agreed, and that's why, over and above the absurd engineering economics
behind it, i don't like NTA. if my signatures don't work because i've
been attacked (for example, one of my name servers has been
compromised), the last thing i'd want is comcast telling their customers
that the data they're getting from my compromised name server is ok to
consume because it's unsigned.

madness test: would we have bothered with DNSSEC at all, back in the
day, if NTA had been known as a definite requirement?

vixie

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