[dns-operations] Massive DNS poisoning attacks in Brazil
vjs at rhyolite.com
Wed Oct 3 00:49:20 UTC 2012
> From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs at anvilwalrusden.com>
> I don't think this is the problem at all. The problem is that even if
> you can get that out at the end point (and I can, using DNSSEC
> Trigger), it does you no good because your application _can't tell_
> what happened. If I'm a web browser programmer, I want to be able to
> know whether the DNSSEC validation worked before I start using the
> TLSA record. Today, that is too much work (and probably reduces to
> "implement a resolver in the browser").
Browsers are certainly not the only application, even if it is true
as Paul Vixie recently said that the Internet is little more than the
web for most connected computers (e.g. phones). Writing DNSSEC
validation code for every application that depends on accurate DNS
data would be as crazy as not using libraries and daemons for other
local authentication and authorization.
The only reasonable solution is to give stub resolvers some of the
features of recursive resolvers including DNSSEC validation and caching
to make the costs of DNSSEC tolerable.
Vernon Schryver vjs at rhyolite.com
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