[dns-operations] DNSSEC undoing independence of root-zone operators
dot at dotat.at
Thu Feb 17 10:06:20 UTC 2011
On Wed, 16 Feb 2011, Phil Pennock wrote:
> A point which has been consistently overlooked is that by making it
> easier to splinter in theory, in practice you reduce the likelihood of
> reaching a condition which would drive people to splinter.
> This is the "de facto vs de jure" argument I make in the post, and is
> the important part of why detente leads to peace not war.
> Your proposal makes it easier for others to assure that the censored
> content came from who it was supposed to come from, but does nothing to
> inhibit the incentive for censorship.
Your last point isn't entirely true. A quorum of witnesses could in theory
decide that they prefer a different root KSK to the ICANN one. On the
other hand the witnesses are supposed to be called on for bootstrapping
only and not during normal operations, so a validator won't notice that a
schism has occurred as long as ICANN's key continues to work.
But really I wanted to solve a practical operational problem. Here is not
the place to do root zone politics, however much I agree that the current
setup leaves a lot to be desired.
f.anthony.n.finch <dot at dotat.at> http://dotat.at/
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