[dns-operations] CERT VU#800113 Multiple DNS implementations vulnerable to cache poisoning

Michael Monnerie michael.monnerie at it-management.at
Thu Jul 10 09:53:53 UTC 2008


On Donnerstag, 10. Juli 2008 Otmar Lendl wrote:
> In his experience, users simply ignore those warnings.

Of course. Because they just cannot understand what the message on the 
screen means. It's like you make a complete medical check and get the 
results in doctor's language (latin TLDs and such). After all, what 
should the user do? If he clicks no, he cannot do netbanking. So he'll 
try again and click yes, and it (seems to) work. Programs would have to 
deny access and display the telephone number of the hotline, that would 
be the only help.

Every day I see end users doing the wrong thing. Otherwise the virus 
problem would be negligible.

mfg zmi
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