[dns-operations] CERT VU#800113 Multiple DNS implementations vulnerable to cache poisoning
ol at bofh.priv.at
Thu Jul 10 08:54:34 UTC 2008
On 2008/07/10 10:07, Sean Donelan <sean at donelan.com> wrote:
> Of course, whether the user ignores or disables the warnings is another
I talked to the online-banking security guy of Austria's largest bank
and he's very pessimistic regarding end-2-end security as provided
by TLS / X.509 certs.
In his experience, users simply ignore those warnings.
It may be even worse: some of the X.509 CAs verify the validity of
a CSR by emailing the "Subject" of the Cert whether this is a valid
signing request. Now, if you manage to attack the DNS resolver of
their outgoing email server, then you can redirect that mail and
thus get a valid X.509 Cert in the Banks name.
-=- Otmar Lendl -- ol at bofh.priv.at -=-
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