[dns-operations] DNS deluge for x.p.ctrc.cc
jgreco at ns.sol.net
Mon Feb 27 21:55:53 UTC 2006
> Geo. wrote:
> >>Both George and Joe are right. It is a problem. Still, solving one and
> >>leaving another untended just because one was used as the attack vector
> >>is silly. Are we to forever leave problem unattended?
> > Gadi,
> > I'm unclear on what you are suggesting. What problem is left unattended with
> > DNS if you cannot spoof UDP packets?
> Recursive servers. There is no reason why this can't be abused in other
> means. ping -f was pretty interesting in the day.
> If we stop being mathematicians for a second trying to understand how
> everything works and making it work better, and be physicists and throw
> more computing power at it (a bigger botnet) one can potentially, using
> this or some other means, cause some pretty serious damage.
> Spoofing just makes this attack "pretty" and a whole lot more efficient.
If you cannot spoof, then when you request a record for x.p.ctrc.cc and
it returns a 4000 byte record, it's returning it to you.
Now, explain what the problem with that is.
Joe Greco - sol.net Network Services - Milwaukee, WI - http://www.sol.net
"We call it the 'one bite at the apple' rule. Give me one chance [and] then I
won't contact you again." - Direct Marketing Ass'n position on e-mail spam(CNN)
With 24 million small businesses in the US alone, that's way too many apples.
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