[org-algorithm-roll] Upcoming DNSSEC changes to PIR delegated Top Level Domains

Suzanne Woolf swoolf at pir.org
Fri Sep 4 18:08:31 UTC 2020

Dear Colleagues,

As Joe and Suzanne have mentioned previously, Afilias is working on several DNSSEC operational changes to the TLDs delegated to PIR. This note enumerates the changes we are planning to make below.  We certainly welcome any comments you may have which could help us improve the plan, along with any clarifying questions.

Suzanne & Joe

As has been described in various technical meetings earlier this year, our immediate goal is to remove any dependency on the SHA-1 algorithm from the DNSSEC parameters used to sign PIR’s top-level domains.
PIR Top-Level Domains
The PIR  top-level domains that will be included in this work are:

संगठन / XN--I1B6B1A6A2E
机构 / XN--NQV7F
орг /  XN--C1AVG
组织机构 / XN--NQV7FS00EMA

Changes to each Top Level Domain DNSKEY RRset
Currently, a DNSSEC enabled query for the DNSKEY RRset for a PIR TLD returns 3 DNSKEYs -- current KSK (2048 bits), current and next ZSKs (1024 bits) -- along with 2 RRSIGs, one by the KSK, one by the current ZSK.  All of the DNSKEYs currently use algorithm 7 (RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1).

Afilias will remove the DNSKEY RRSIG generated using the ZSK, as this is superfluous.

Most importantly, we will be performing an algorithm roll of the DNSKEYs to algorithm 8 (RSA/SHA-256), using the methodology described in RFC 6781.

At this time, we do not plan to suppress the pre-publication of the incoming ZSK.
We also do not plan to increase the size of the ZSK for now, to keep response sizes smaller while we perform the algorithm roll. We plan to increase the effective ZSK key strength at a later date, e.g. by rolling in a 2048-bit RSA key or doing an algorithm roll from algorithm 8 (RSA/SHA-256) to algorithm 13 (ECDSA P-256). We will share details of our plans once they have solidified, which we do not expect to happen before this first set of changes is complete.
Changes to each Top Level Domain Delegation DS RRset

We will be removing all DS records in the root zone which use algorithm 1 (SHA-1).  This will reduce the DS RRSet to a single DS record.  The DS record will be changed as part of the  algorithm roll mentioned above.

Changes to each Top Level Domain NSEC3PARAM

Afilias will be changing the salt value during the algorithm roll, Hash Iterations: we will be changing the number of hash iterations from 1 to 100.


Below is an estimated timeline for this transition.  Later dates could be subject to change due to an unforeseen delay. We’ve tried to allow plenty of time for anomalies to appear, while keeping things moving.

# Task Timeframe Dependencies Notes

1 Signer Adjustments 2020-09-15 None Stop ZSK RRSIG on DNSKEYS, etc.

2 Generate key material 2020-09-15 None SHA-256 DNSKEYs, DSs

3 Re-sign w/ new ZSK 2020-09-15 2 Allows for comments, holiday

4 RRSIG hold down period 2020-09-15 - 2020-09-21 3

5 Publish new DNSKEYs 2020-09-21- 2020-09-25 4

6 DNSKEY add hold down 2020-09-25 - 2020-09-28 5

7 Prepare RZM Request 2020-09-22 - 2020-09-24 2

8 Send RZM Request 2020-09-28 6, 7

9 RZM Processing 2020-09-28 - 2020-10-05 8 Assumes timely ACKs

10 DS change hold down period 2020-09-29 - 2020-10-09 9

11 Remove old DNSKEYs 2020-10-13 - 2020-10-19 10 and also old KSK RRSIG

12 DNSKEY remove hold down 2020-10-13 - 2020-10-23 11

13 Remove old RRSIGs 2020-10-17 - 2020-10-25 12

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