<div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_default" style="font-size:small"><br></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Sat, Jan 27, 2018 at 2:51 PM, Mark Jeftovic <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:markjr@easydns.com" target="_blank">markjr@easydns.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=""><br>
<br>
John R Levine wrote:<br>
<br>
> For every Sci-Hub, there are a dozen Daily Stormers and a thousand fake<br>
> phish banks, fake "Canadian" pharmacies, and other malicious sites. The<br>
> history of name registries that don't deal with illegal activities is,<br>
> to put it mildly, unpleasant. If you haven't seen any of them, that's<br>
> not a coincidence, other networks tend not to accept their traffic.<br>
><br>
> For the specific issue of Sci-Hub, academics claim they want open access<br>
> to their papers, at least in developing countries, but they send those<br>
> papers to publishers like Elsevier who charge $30 a peek. They need to<br>
> make up their minds. And while the technology of an online open access<br>
> journal is straightforward, nobody's figured out how to do for free the<br>
> useful part of what Elsevier does, gatekeepers and reviewers who find<br>
> the publication-worthy stuff in the mountain of garbage.<br>
><br>
<br>
</span>A lot of people pined for a decentralized P2P DNS over the years, every<br>
time their was outrage at ICANN or Verisign, something I always said was<br>
impossible, until blockchain came along and I realized how wrong I'd been.<br>
<br>
When the Ethereum Name Service WG met last summer they seemed to prefer<br>
an immutable registry at the bottom (blockchain) with governance,<br>
blocking, filtering happening at "Layer 2", something I'm personally<br>
skeptical about.<br>
<br>
But then when you sit down actually try to design your registry<br>
implementation you run into all these things you're talking about above.<br>
Governance is "non-trivial" and I think it's a mistake to think it can<br>
just be deferred to "layer 2" because nobody even knows what that looks<br>
like right now.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-size:small">I disagree with the claim that there is a need to put 'governance' in the DNS layer. You can do just fine if you put the governance in a layer above the DNS which is of course the function of the WebPKI. </div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-size:small"><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-size:small">The WebPKI was developed and deployed to achieve accountability. The DNS is not.</div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-size:small"><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-size:small">Trying to rely on the DNS infrastructure to mitigate criminal activity is futile. Which is why I find the attempts to dilute the WebPKI to be nothing more than an adjunct to DNS validation (which does not happen) to be retrograde.</div><br></div><div><br></div><div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-size:small">Of course, most people don't want to be spending the type of money required for an effective validation process.</div><br></div></div></div></div>