<div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><div id="gmail-:5ag" class="gmail-ii gmail-gt gmail-adP gmail-adO"><div id="gmail-:5af" class="gmail-a3s gmail-aXjCH gmail-m1598f77e5ec47d94"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">[Apologies for possible multiple copies]<br><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">We
have extended the submission deadline for the NDSS DNS Privacy Workshop
to Wednesday, January 18 because of the intervening holidays for many
interested people. Please contact us (Sara and Allison) if you have
questions. Note that the formats are flexed a bit as well: page
lengths and format are flexible now and we are also willing to receive
draft presentations as long as they have an abstract early in the deck.
The goal of the workshop is interchange and advancing the state of play
for DNS privacy and its adjacent technologies.<br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><br>The call for papers is here: <a href="https://www.internetsociety.org/events/ndss-symposium/ndss-symposium-2017/dns-privacy-workshop-2017-call-papers" target="_blank"> DPRIV17</a>. The deadline on the web page at NDSS hasn't been changed yet, but the submission system is set with the new deadline.<br><br>Elevator
pitch: DNS queries and domain names are metadata and there are many
new directions (and open questions) for mitigating privacy issues for
them.<br><br>Location and Important dates:<br>Workshop Location: San Diego, CA, USA
<p>Workshop date: 2017-02-26 (co-located with NDSS 2017) </p>
<p>Submissions: 2017-01-18 anywhere-on-earth</p>
<p>Final date for notifications and invitations to present at the workshop: 2017-02-03</p>Submissions
may be new papers, papers already published, Short Papers, or Position
Papers. Also, please contact the TPC chairs if you want to suggest a
panel.<br><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">Allison and Sara<br><br><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><a href="mailto:allison.mankin@gmail.com" target="_blank">allison.mankin@gmail.com</a><br></div><a href="mailto:sara@sinodun.com" target="_blank">sara@sinodun.com</a><br></div><br>------------<br><h3><strong>Workshop on DNS Privacy DPRIV17 (#NoMoreCowbell)</strong></h3>
<h3>Background</h3><h3><font size="2"><span style="font-weight:normal">DNS Privacy has been a growing concern of the IETF and others in the
Internet engineering community for the last few years. Almost every
activity on the Internet starts with a DNS query (and often several).
</span></font></h3><ul><li>Those queries can reveal not only what websites an individual visits
but also metadata about other services such as the domains of email
contacts or chat services.
</li><li>Whilst the data in the DNS is public, individual DNS transactions made by an end user <strong>should not</strong> be public.
</li><li>Today, however DNS queries are sent in <strong>clear text</strong> (using UDP or TCP) which means passive eavesdroppers can observe all the DNS lookups performed.
</li><li>The DNS is a globally distributed system that crosses international
boundaries and often uses servers in many different countries in order
to provide resilience.
</li><li>It is well known that the NSA used the MORECOWBELL tool to perform
mass surveillance of DNS traffic, and other surveillance techniques
involving DNS almost certainly are in play today.
</li><li>Some ISPs embed user information (e.g. a user ID or MAC address)
within DNS queries that go to the ISP’s resolver in order to provide
services such as Parental Filtering. This allows for fingerprinting of
individual users.
</li><li>Some CDNs embed user information (e.g. client subnets) in queries
from resolvers to authoritative servers (to geo-locate end users). This
allows for correlation of queries to particular subnets.
</li><li>Some ISPs log DNS queries at the resolver and share this information
with third-parties in ways not known or obvious to end users. </li></ul>
<p>The IETF's DPRIVE (<strong>D</strong>NS <strong>PRIV</strong>ate <strong>E</strong>xchange)
Working Group has taken initial protocol steps to address these
concerns (with much of the early work focussing on the stub to resolver
problem), publishing DNS Privacy Considerations (RFC 7626),
Specification for DNS over Transport Layer Security (RFC 7858), and The
EDNS(0) Padding Option (RFC 7830), and DNS Query Name Minimisation to
Improve Privacy (RFC 7816). However because of the great diversity of
the DNS ecosystem, and the pervasive role of DNS and domain names in
Internet applications and security, much is not fully understood or
resolved. </p>
<p>The goal of this workshop is to bring together privacy and Internet
researchers with a diversity of backgrounds and views, to identify
promising long-term mitigations of the broad space of DNS privacy risks.</p><p><br></p><p><br></p></div></div></div></div></div><img id="gmail-:0_82" name=":0" src="https://plus.google.com/u/0/_/focus/photos/public/AIbEiAIAAABDCPOdrreLybbONSILdmNhcmRfcGhvdG8qKGQ3YzE3ZWVmMDZhMDA4MmExN2ZjOGRhNzMwZDE2Zjg3MzdlM2VlMTkwAYtTv2S5bhRFp3-4Z16Sr2R1k3Pi?sz=32" class="gmail-ajn gmail-bofPge"></div></div>