[dns-operations] DNSSec validation issue for .se (missing denial of existence for *.se)

Hannes Mehnert hannes at mehnert.org
Tue Jan 11 15:15:25 UTC 2022


Hi DNS operators,

since this is my first mail here, I first would like to thank you all 
for the constructive discussions and technical expertise. I'm developing 
a DNS suite in OCaml, a statically typed functional programming language 
[see https://github.com/mirage/ocaml-dns // https://mirageos.org if 
interested], and have learned a lot from lurking on this list. My 
current work item is a recursive resolver.

When I just implemented the denial of existence for DNSSec (with NSEC), 
I stumbled upon the TLD .se that uses NSEC. I mailed earlier to 
registry-default at nic dot se (the hostmaster in the SOA of .se), but 
didn't get a reply.

Of course, I may be wrong with my analysis, if this is the case please 
help me to understand how this should work.

I'm wondering how other validators (public resolvers) deal with the 
following issue, which is a missing denial of existence for *.se: So, a 
request for resource record type A, domain name a.se results in the 
following:

$ dig +dnssec a.se

se.                     5363    IN      SOA catcher-in-the-rye.nic.se. 
registry-default.nic.se. 2022010921 1800 1800 864000 7200
se.                     5363    IN      RRSIG   SOA 8 1 172800 
20220122054639 20220109191050 30015 se.  [...]
_nicname._tcp.se.       6694    IN      NSEC    acem.a.se. SRV RRSIG NSEC
_nicname._tcp.se.       6694    IN      RRSIG   NSEC 8 3 7200 
20220121191006 20220108001053 30015 se. [...]

Which provides a non-existence proof for everything between 
_nicname._tcp.se and acem.a.se, but nothing for *.se (which according to 
the order of canonical domain names, is before _nicname._tcp.se -- even 
before 0.se that seems to be the first registered domain name).

The NSEC record missing from the reply above is the following NSEC and 
RRSIG ($ dig +dnssec ns \!.se).

se.                     4353    IN      NSEC    0.se. NS SOA TXT RRSIG 
NSEC DNSKEY
se.                     4353    IN      RRSIG   NSEC 8 1 7200 
20220121132017 20220108061050 30015 se. 
jzWI5l5Sxyb2sOLzCWNX06nwmCtZuFdS3PvmivnyOPVZ3cw+blBXNYwN 
cFCYFdMC7R31W0ABBuT587mAm7Ae5NJX2GnXGcNgaVcD9VhKWAjJHpqf 
+NJcLOF9771m/BKPC7dKTwt/zVdKJSwFjaYTr0streS9OMCnJXbiWaQc 
CMDmzko2WiWdBNDAbZ8H/OfKymYjgJz1hZynMdl5LyWcGgxlOksuLKSv 
4xg4Ey07r4ZCy5XTQwfHG74qWa+61BVjfP3KEEEB42B0rZX8lT15B9MS 
Cg9RmBObNC5FYjXGkbeik6iXrdOGzUUURHay+th9SJ4BGIFIV8fyyDTd oxOc5w==


Thank you for reading,

Hannes Mehnert
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