[dns-operations] root? we don't need no stinkin' root!

Bill Woodcock woody at pch.net
Tue Nov 26 13:46:30 UTC 2019

Yes, in the long term you can only survive by being both large and clever, not just one or the other. 

> On Nov 26, 2019, at 13:03, David Conrad <drc at virtualized.org> wrote:
> On Nov 26, 2019, at 11:33 AM, Jim Reid <jim at rfc1035.com> wrote:
>>> On 26 Nov 2019, at 09:16, Florian Weimer <fw at deneb.enyo.de> wrote:
>>> Up until recently, well-behaved recursive resolvers had to forward
>>> queries to the root if they were not already covered by a delegation.
>>> RFC 7816 and in particular RFC 8198 changed that, but before that, it
>>> was just how the protocol was expected to work.
>> So what? These RFCs make very little difference to the volume of queries a resolving server will send to the root. QNAME minimisation has no impact at all: the root just sees a query for .com instead of foobar.com. A recursive resolver should already be supporting negative caching and will have a reasonably complete picture of what's in (or not in) the root. RFC8198 will of course help that but not by much IMO.
> It would appear a rather large percentage of queries to the root (like 50% in some samples) are random strings, between 7 to 15 characters long, sometimes longer.  I believe this is Chrome-style probing to determine if there is NXDOMAIN redirection. A good example of the tragedy of the commons, like water pollution and climate change.
> If resolvers would enable DNSSEC validation, there would, in theory, be a reduction in these queries due to aggressive NSEC caching.  Of course, practice may not match theory (https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/32/contributions/717/attachments/713/1206/2019-10-31-oarc-nsec-caching.pdf). 
> Of course, steady state query load is largely irrelevant since root service has to be provisioned with massive DDoS in mind. In my personal view, the deployment of additional anycast instances by the root server operators is a useful stopgap, but ultimately, given the rate of growth of DoS attack capacity (and assuming that growth will continue due to the stunning security practices of IoT device manufacturers), stuff like what is discussed in that paper is the right long term strategy.
> Regards,
> -drc
> (Speaking for myself)
> _______________________________________________
> dns-operations mailing list
> dns-operations at lists.dns-oarc.net
> https://lists.dns-oarc.net/mailman/listinfo/dns-operations
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <https://lists.dns-oarc.net/pipermail/dns-operations/attachments/20191126/4a1180cf/attachment.html>

More information about the dns-operations mailing list