[dns-operations] More Aggressive prefetch for popular names

Lanlan Pan abbypan at gmail.com
Tue Apr 9 13:03:36 UTC 2019


Sometimes the long time stale response is caused by a sensitive "use stale
response when encounter timeout or servfail to authoriative nameserver"
policy.

Paul Hoffman <phoffman at proper.com> 于2019年4月8日周一 下午10:09写道:

> It sounds like you are saying "some resolver operators extend the TTLs
> given in DNS responses, and this causes problems". If so, we agree.
>
> If, however, you are saying "some resolver operators extend the TTLs
> given in DNS responses, and this causes problems that the rest of the
> DNS community should solve", we disagree. The customers of that resolver
> will have problems like the one you listed, and that is fully the fault
> of the resolver operator.
>
> On 7 Apr 2019, at 21:26, Davey Song wrote:
>
> >  Local resolver has policy/strategy to set a larger TTL to reduce the
> > upstream traffic, in order to increase the cache hit rate and response
> > time. Some times, local resolver has policy to serve stale data in
> > case of
> > network failure after TTL timeout. There may be others situation cause
> > the
> > cache serve stale data.
>
> This is a misconfiguration on the part of the resolver operator.
>
> > If any intentional operation, or software bug, or manual
> > misconfiguration
> > on resolver will cause the serve-stale situation which will become a
> > problems for names changing their records like NS, A/AAAA during the
> > period
> > of stale data in the cache but not others keep unchanged.
> >
> > The recent event happened last week was a name of CCTV VOD services,
> > people
> > call in complaining they can not open the video. It was found that in
> > Gang
> > Zhou City, the DNS of a local broadband service provider served stale
> > data
> > for that name for hours. It is not clear which conflict or bug make
> > the
> > trouble, but the fact is cache of that local ISP and downstream
> > forwarder's
> > cache got impact. It takes time to purge that cache.
>
> Exactly right. That resolver operator should investigate the bug (most
> likely in their configuration, possibly in the unnamed resolver software
> they are using, and prevent it from happening in the future.
>
> > I did it in the above. It does not sound like an exaggeration, I
> > think. If
> > you are talking with CDN/Cloud people, this is a typical operation
> > issue
> > they need to face.
>
> It is not "typical": we rarely hear of this problem.
>
> >  No. DNS in ISP and Teleco did something wrong.
>
> One which can be fixed.
>
> > As you are one author of
> > DOH, you must konw how name owners want to bypass the DNS in the
> > middle.
>
> This makes no sense. DoH was developed so that applications can use
> resolvers securely using HTTP semantics; that's completely unrelated to
> what you have said above.
>
> --Paul Hoffman
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