[dns-operations] DNSSEC and FIPS-140
James.Stevens at jrcs.co.uk
Sat Dec 1 15:23:10 UTC 2018
>> The reason for the confusion is that PowerDNS is unable to return
>> a RRSIG for NSEC or NSEC3 if MD5 is disabled at the O/S level.
>> It just crashes.
>> But I have no idea why it would need it??
>> I need to look at the source.
> I think you need to take this discussion to a PowerDNS forum/mailing
> list. What you're saying doesn't seem possible. It's highly unlikely a
> query will cause a DNS server to crash because "MD5 is disabled at the
> O/S Level" (whatever you mean by that). However if your OS has a mangled
> SSL library, all bets are off.
Thanks, Jim. Sounds like you're right.
I was just trying to figure out if there was *any* reason why a zone
signed NSEC or NSEC3, using ECDSA256 keys, would ever /legitimately/
The answer seems to be "no".
If so, this can only be an issue for PowerDNS.
We're running a PowerDNS Master on RHEL 7 installed with FIPS compliance,
... which (I believe) installs the FIPS OpenSSL module -
RHEL/FIPS enforces FIPS compliance at the O/S level. e.g. it disables
all non-FIPS-140 compliant algorithms (inc MD5) within OpenSSL, so they
can't be used for any reason whatsoever.
On a PowerDNS master, with "exmaple.com" signed NSEC or NSEC3 with
ECDA256 KSK & ZSK, this query works fine ...
$ dig @127.0.0.1 example.com soa
... but this query will crash PowerDNS ...
$ dig +dnssec @127.0.0.1 example.com soa
By "crash" I mean PowerDNS core-dumps - interestingly with signal 6,
SIGABRT - so sounds like some kind of assertion has failed - like you
said, looks like this needs to be taken up elsewhere.
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