[dns-operations] DNS reflection useful without amplification?
Paul Vixie
paul at redbarn.org
Wed Sep 7 08:23:44 UTC 2016
Mark Andrews wrote:
> Reflection requires more time to trace back to the source. You have to
> trace from the target to the reflector then from the reflector to the
> initiator.
>
> Reflection increases the number of streams that need to be chased back.
yes.
see also this text:
<< We are ... directly aware of a vast number of routers, switches,
servers, name servers, firewalls, and other on-path devices whose
principle bottleneck is packets not bits. That is, these devices might
be able to receive or forward five hundred megabits per second (500
Mbit/sec) of large packets but only a fifty megabits bits per second (50
Mbit/sec) of small packets. This is weak engineering on their part but
we don't get to judge the manufacturers or the operators of these weak
devices — we must take them into account when planning our defense. >>
(http://www.circleid.com/posts/20130913_on_the_time_value_of_security_features_in_dns/)
anyone who considers this claim dubious is invited to provide a
counterclaim with its own justification. a mere claim of dubiousness
with neither counter-claim nor justiciation is not an example of the
kind of critical thinking we'll have to use to solve any of the
internet's security problems. feel free to make your counter-claim as a
comment on the circle-id article quoted above, if you desire persistence.
--
P Vixie
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