[dns-operations] REMINDER: Call for Participation -- ICANN DNSSEC Workshop at ICANN 55 in Marrakech, Morocco
julie.hedlund at icann.org
Mon Jan 4 15:08:16 UTC 2016
REMINDER: Call for Participation -- ICANN DNSSEC Workshop at ICANN 55 in
The DNSSEC Deployment Initiative and the Internet Society Deploy360
Programme, in cooperation with the ICANN Security and Stability Advisory
Committee (SSAC), are planning a DNSSEC Workshop at the ICANN 55 meeting on
09 March 2016 in Marrakech, Morocco. The DNSSEC Workshop has been a part of
ICANN meetings for several years and has provided a forum for both
experienced and new people to meet, present and discuss current and future
DNSSEC deployments. For reference, the most recent session was held at the
ICANN meeting in Dublin, Ireland on 21 October 2015. The presentations and
transcripts are available at:
At ICANN 55 we are particularly interested in live demonstrations of uses of
DNSSEC or DANE. Examples might include:
* Email clients and servers using DNSSEC, OPENPGPKEY, or S/MIME for secure
* Tools for automating the generation of DNSSEC/DANE records.
* Services for monitoring or managing DNSSEC signing or validation.
* Tools or services for using DNSSEC/DANE along with other existing
services such as SSH, XMPP, SMTP, S/MIME or PGP/GPG.
* Innovative uses of APIs to do something new and different using
* S/MIME and Microsoft Outlook integration with active directory.
Our interest is to provide current examples of the state of development and
to show real-world examples of how DNSSEC and DANE related innovation can be
used to increase the overall security of the Internet.
We are open to presentations and demonstrations related to any topic
associated with DNSSEC and DANE. Examples of the types of topics we are
1. DNSSEC activities in Africa
For this panel we are seeking participation from those who have been
involved in DNSSEC deployment in Africa and also from those who have not
deployed DNSSEC but who have a keen interest in the challenges and benefits
of deployment. In particular, we will consider the following questions:
Are you interested in reporting on DNSSEC validation of your ISPs? What can
DNSSEC do for you? What doesn't it do? What are the internal tradeoffs to
implementing DNSSEC? What did you learn in your deployment of DNSSEC? We
are interested in presentations from both people involved with the signing
of domains and people involved with the deployment of DNSSEC-validating DNS
2. Potential impacts of Root Key Rollover
Given many concerns about the need to do a Root Key Rollover, we would like
to bring together a panel of people who can talk about what the potential
impacts may be to ISPs, equipment providers and end users, and also what can
be done to potentially mitigate those issues. In particular, we are seeking
participation from vendors, ISPs, and the community that will be affected by
distribution of new root keys. We would like to be able to offer
suggestions out of this panel to the wider technical community. If you have
a specific concern about the Root Key Rollover, or believe you have a method
or solution to help address impacts, we would like to hear from you.
3. Implementing DNSSEC validation at Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) play a critical role by enabling DNSSEC
validation for the caching DNS resolvers used by their customers. We have
now seen massive rollouts of DNSSEC validation within large North American
ISPs and at ISPs around the world. We are interested in presentations on
topics such as:
* Can you describe your experiences with negative Trust Anchors and
* What does an ISP need to do to prepare its network for implementing DNSSEC
* How does an ISP need to prepare its support staff and technical staff for
the rollout of DNSSEC validation?
* What measurements are available about the degree of DNSSEC validation
* What tools are available to help an ISP deploy DNSSEC validation?
* What are the practical server-sizing impacts of enabling DNSSEC validation
on ISP DNS Resolvers (ex. cost, memory, CPU, bandwidth, technical support,
4. The operational realities of running DNSSEC
Now that DNSSEC has become an operational norm for many registries,
registrars, and ISPs, what have we learned about how we manage DNSSEC? What
is the best practice around key rollovers? How often do you review your
disaster recovery procedures? Is there operational familiarity within your
customer support teams? What operational statistics have we gathered about
DNSSEC? Are there experiences being documented in the form of best
practices, or something similar, for transfer of signed zones?
5. DANE and DNSSEC application automation
For DNSSEC to reach massive deployment levels it is clear that a higher
level of automation is required than is currently available. There also is
strong interest for DANE usage within web transactions as well as for
securing email and Voice-over-IP (VoIP). We are seeking presentations on
topics such as:
* What tools, systems and services are available to help automate DNSSEC key
* Can you provide an analysis of current tools/services and identify gaps?
* Where are the best opportunities for automation within DNSSEC signing and
* What are the costs and benefits of different approaches to automation?
* What are some of the new and innovative uses of DANE and other DNSSEC
applications in new areas or industries?
* What tools and services are now available that can support DANE usage?
* How soon could DANE and other DNSSEC applications become a deployable
* How can the industry use DANE and other DNSSEC applications as a mechanism
for creating a more secure Internet?
We would be particularly interested in any live demonstrations of DNSSEC /
DANE application automation and services. For example, a demonstration of
the actual process of setting up a site with a certificate stored in a TLSA
record that correctly validates would be welcome. Demonstrations of new
tools that make the setup of DNSSEC or DANE more automated would also be
6. When unexpected DNSSEC events occur
What have we learned from some of the operational outages that we have seen
over the past 18 months? Are there lessons that we can pass on to those just
about to implement DNSSEC? How do you manage dissemination of information
about the outage? What have you learned about communications planning? Do
you have a route to ISPs and registrars? How do you liaise with your CERT
7. DNSSEC and DANE in the enterprise
Enterprises can play a critical role in both providing DNSSEC validation to
their internal networks and also through signing of the domains owned by the
enterprise. We are seeking presentations from enterprises that have
implemented DNSSEC on validation and/or signing processes and can address
questions such as:
* What are the benefits to enterprises of rolling out DNSSEC validation? And
how do they do so?
* What are the challenges to deployment for these organizations and how
could DANE and other DNSSEC applications address those challenges?
* How should an enterprise best prepare its IT staff and network to
* What tools and systems are available to assist enterprises in the
deployment of DNSSEC?
* How can the DANE protocol be used within an enterprise to bring a higher
level of security to transactions using SSL/TLS certificates?
8. Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) use cases and innovation
We are interested in demonstrations of HSMs, presentations of HSM-related
innovations and real world use cases of HSMs and key management.
In addition, we welcome suggestions for additional topics.
If you are interested in participating, please send a brief (1-2 sentence)
description of your proposed presentation to dnssec-marrakech at isoc.org by
**Monday, 11 January 2016**
We hope that you can join us.
On behalf of the DNSSEC Workshop Program Committee:
Mark Elkins, DNS/ZACR
Cath Goulding, Nominet UK
Jean Robert Hountomey, AfricaCERT
Jacques Latour, .CA
Xiaodong Lee, CNNIC
Luciano Minuchin, NIC.AR
Russ Mundy, Parsons
Ondřej Surý, CZ.NIC
Yoshiro Yoneya, JPRS
Dan York, Internet Society
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