[dns-operations] Call for Participation -- ICANN DNSSEC Workshop 26 March 2014
Julie Hedlund
julie.hedlund at icann.org
Wed Jan 8 16:20:57 UTC 2014
Call for Participation -- ICANN DNSSEC Workshop 26 March 2014
Happy New Year! The DNSSEC Deployment Initiative and the Internet Society
Deploy360 Programme, in cooperation with the ICANN Security and Stability
Advisory Committee (SSAC), are planning a DNSSEC Workshop at the ICANN
meeting in Singapore on 26 March 2014. The DNSSEC Workshop has been a part
of ICANN meetings for several years and has provided a forum for both
experienced and new people to meet, present and discuss current and future
DNSSEC deployments. For reference, the most recent session was held at the
ICANN meeting in Buenos Aires, Argentina on 20 November 2013. The
presentations and transcripts are available at:
hhttp://buenosaires48.icann.org/en/schedule/wed-dnssec
<http://durban47.icann.org/node/39749> .
We are seeking presentations on the following topics:
1. DNSSEC Activities in the Asia Pacific region:
For this panel we are seeking participation from those who have been
involved in DNSSEC deployment in the Asia Pacific region and also from those
who have not deployed DNSSEC but who have a keen interest in the challenges
and benefits of deployment. In particular, we will consider the following
questions: What can DNSSEC do for you? What doesn't it do? What are the
internal tradeoffs to implementing DNSSEC?
2. The Operational Realities of Running DNSSEC
Now that DNSSEC has become an operational norm for many registries,
registrars, and ISPs, what have we learned about how we manage DNSSEC? What
is the best practice around key rollovers? How often do you review your
disaster recovery procedures? Is there operational familiarity within your
customer support teams? What operational statistics have we gathered about
DNSSEC? Are there experiences being documented in the form of best
practices, or something similar, for transfer of signed zones?
3. Implementing DNSSEC Validation At Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) play a critical role by enabling DNSSEC
validation for the caching DNS resolvers used by their customers. We have
now seen massive rollouts of DNSSEC validation within large North American
ISPs and at ISPs around the world. We are interested in presentations on
topics such as:
* What does an ISP need to do to prepare its network for implementing DNSSEC
validation?
* How does an ISP need to prepare its support staff and technical staff for
the rollout of DNSSEC validation?
* What measurements are available about the degree of DNSSEC validation
currently deployed?
* What tools are available to help an ISP deploy DNSSEC validation?
* What are the practical server-sizing impacts of enabling DNSSEC validation
on ISP DNS Resolvers (ex. cost, memory, cpu, bandwidth, technical support,
etc.)?
4. DNSSEC and DANE In The Enterprise
Similar to ISPs, enterprises can play a critical role in both providing
DNSSEC validation to their internal networks and also through signing of the
enterprises's own domains. We are seeking presentations from enterprises who
have implemented DNSSEC on either or both validation and signing and can
address questions such as:
* What are the benefits to enterprises of rolling out DNSSEC validation? And
how do they do so?
* What are the challenges to deployment for these organizations and how
could DANE and other DNSSEC applications address those challenges?
* How should an enterprise best prepare its IT staff and network to
implement DNSSEC?
* What tools and systems are available to assist enterprises in the
deployment of DNSSEC?
* How can the DANE protocol be used within an enterprise to bring a higher
level of security to transactions using SSL/TLS certificates?
5. DANE and DNSSEC Applications
The DNS-based Authentication of Named Entitites (DANE) protocol is an
exciting development where DNSSEC can be used to provide a strong additional
trust layer for traditional SSL/TLS certificates. There is strong interest
for DANE usage within web transactions as well as for securing email and
Voice-over-IP (VoIP). We are seeking presentations on topics such as:
* What are some of the new and innovative uses of DANE and other DNSSEC
applications in new areas or industries?
* What tools and services are now available that can support DANE usage?
* How soon could DANE and other DNSSEC applications become a deployable
reality?
* How can the industry used DANE and other DNSSEC applications as a
mechanism for creating a more secure Internet?
We would be particularly interested in any live demonstrations of DNSSEC /
DANE applications and services. For example, a demonstration of the actual
process of setting up a site with a certificate stored in a TLSA record that
correctly validates would be welcome. Demonstrations of new tools that make
the setup of DNSSEC or DANE more automated would also be welcome.
6. When Unexpected DNSSEC Events Occur
What have we learned from some of the operational outages that we have seen
over the past 18 months? Are there lessons that we can pass on to those just
about to implement DNSSEC? How do you manage dissemination of information
about the outage? What have you learned about communications planning? Do
you have a route to ISPs and registrars? How do you liaise with your CERT
community?
7. Preparing for Root Key Rollover
For this topic we are seeking input on issues relating to root key rollover.
In particular, we are seeking comments from vendors, ISPs, and the community
that will be affected by distribution of new root keys.
8. DNSSEC Automation
For DNSSEC to reach massive deployment levels it is clear that a higher
level of automation is required than is currently available. Topics for
which we would like to see presentations include:
* What tools, systems and services are available to help automate DNSSEC key
management?
* Can you provide an analysis of current tools/services and identify gaps?
* Where in the various pieces that make up DNSSEC signing and validation are
the best opportunities for automation?
* What are the costs and benefits of different approaches to automation?
9. Guidance for Registrars in Supporting DNSSEC:
The 2013 Registrar Accreditation Agreement (RAA) for Registrars and
Resellers requires the support of DNSSEC beginning on January 1, 2014. We
are seeking presentations discussing:
* What are the specific technical requirements of the RAA and how can
registrars meet those requirements?
* What tools and systems are available for registrars that include DNSSEC
support?
* What information do registrars need to provide to resellers and ultimately
customers?
We are particularly interested in hearing from registrars who have signed
the 2013 RAA and have either already implemented DNSSEC support or have a
plan for doing so.
10. APIs Between the Registrars and DNS Hosting Operators
One specific area that has been identified as needing focus is the
communication between registrars and DNS hosting operators, specifically
when these functions are provided by different entities. Right now the
communication, such as the transfer of a DS record, occurs primarily by way
of the domain name holder copying and pasting information from one web
interface to another. How can this be automated? We would welcome
presentations by either registrars or DNS hosting operators who have
implemented APIs for the communication of DNSSEC information - or from
people with ideas around how such APIs could be constructed.
In addition, we welcome suggestions for additional topics.
If you are interested in participating, please send a brief (1-2 sentence)
description of your proposed presentation to dnssec-singapore at shinkuro.com
by **Friday, 31 January 2014**
We hope that you can join us.
Thank you,
Julie Hedlund
On behalf of the DNSSEC Workshop Program Committee:
Steve Crocker, Shinkuro
Mark Elkins, DNS/ZACR
Cath Goulding, Nominet UK
Jean Robert Hountomey, AfricaCERT
Jacques Latour, .CA
Xiaodong Lee, CNNIC
Luciano Minuchin, NIC.AR
Russ Mundy, Sparta/Parsons
Ondřej Surý, CZ.NIC
Lance Wolak, .ORG, The Public Interest Registry
Yoshiro Yoneya, JPRS
Dan York, Internet Society
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