[dns-operations] summary of recent vulnerabilities in DNS security.
haya.shulman at gmail.com
Sat Oct 26 10:12:43 UTC 2013
> No number of hosts sending packets can exceed 25,000 500 Byte packets
> to a single 100 MHz 802.3 host. In fact, 802.3 preamble, headers, CRC,
> and IFG limit the 500 Byte packet rate to below 25K pps. However,
> multiple attacking hosts could cause excessive link-layer contention
> (nothing to do with host or host network interface "interrupts" or
> "buffers") and so packet losses in either or both directions for
> legitimate DNS traffic and so the reported effects.
> Without data such as packet counts from standard tools such as `netstat`,
> my bet is what I said before, that the application fell behind, its socket
> buffer overflowed, and the results were as seen. However, I would not
> bet too much, because there are many other places where the DNS requests
> or responses could have been lost including:
> - intentional rate limiting in the DNS server, perhaps even RRL
> - intentional rate limiting in the kernel such as iptables
> - intentional rate limiting in a bridge ("hub") in the path
> - unintentional link layer rate limiting due to contention for
> bridge buffers or wires. At full speed from the attacking systems,
> unrelated cross traffic through hubs in the path or on the wires
> to DNS server would cause packet losses including losses of valid
> answers and so timeouts and so the observed effect.
No iptables rules were set; no RRL was applied (when sending bursts to
incorrect/closed port - legitimate responses arrived ok).
There are these measurments that studied loss due to traffic volume, and
they found that Kernel loss occurs at above 100-150 Kpps (packets per
second), with 64 byte packets. One of these works, in addition to measuring
loss in kernel, also measured performance of snort under heavy load, and
found loss could occur above 100KB.
Two significant differences between our and their setting is that they used
only a single host that generated the traffic, and the traffic consisted of
64 Byte packets (we used 500Byte packets).
In any case, I am curious as to wether the loss occured in DNS software and
if increasing the buffers in DNS software can mitigate the problem (I'll
run it again to confirm).
Technische Universität Darmstadt
FB Informatik/EC SPRIDE
Tel. +49 6151 16-75540
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