[dns-operations] recursive nameservers with "hidden" auth zones?
aditya at grot.org
Thu Mar 14 12:21:32 UTC 2013
I didn't mean to be opaque, but just in case it clarifies more:
The question is "does the benefit of quicker updates outweigh the risks
involved in serving a few select zones authoritatively from a recursive
server that is open to a select population?"
I do realize that that is a determination for my organization to make,
but if more of the risks were enumerated for non-open resolvers, it
would be easier to weigh.
On Wed, Mar 13, 2013 at 06:17:49PM -0400, R.P. Aditya wrote:
> In the interest of providing quick updates to a "trusted" population of
> 100k or so end clients, there is a desire to provide a few zones
> authoritatively on the internal servers that provide recursion to the
> same population. These servers are not reachable at the publically
> listed IP addresses in the NS record for those zones.
> Beyond the (real) risk of cache poisoning by the 100k "trusted" folks
> (which exists even if we remove those select zones), what other
> DNS-specific security risks might be minimized by a strict separation of
> auth and recursive processes (beyond the usual modularity arguments)?
> Pointers to public documentation of answers happily accepted.
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