[dns-operations] Recently closed open resolver and reflection attacks

WBrown at e1b.org WBrown at e1b.org
Wed Mar 6 18:11:28 UTC 2013

Joe Abley <jabley at hopcount.ca> wrote on 03/06/2013 12:49:22 PM:

> On 2013-03-06, at 12:36, WBrown at e1b.org wrote:
> > Is there any reason why recursive queries to an authoritative server 
> > would normally get a REFUSED reply shouldn't be dropped instead of 
> > an answer?
> There's no amplification potential in sending such queries, so 
> perhaps not much of a threat to defend against. As I understand your
> original message, now, RRL would presumably penalise repeat offenders.

True, there is no amplification, but there is traffic to the real owner of 
the spoofed address.  One machine could launch 1M spoofed queries to many, 
many authoritative name servers which would happily send answers to the 
target This may subject to rate limiting which would reduce the flood 
some, but they just abuse more name servers to make up for it.
> There's always reduced ability to troubleshoot and the potential for
> time-outs when you don't send a reply at all.

Yes, the result of a dropped packet would be a timeout, which would have 
to be handled at the source of the query. 
> Suppressing REFUSED responses seems like potential risk and little 

Benefit is not for me, but for the target of the flood - until I become 
the target. :)

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