[dns-operations] Implementation of negative trust anchors?
jabley at hopcount.ca
Fri Aug 23 00:43:13 UTC 2013
On 2013-08-22, at 16:58, Randy Bush <randy at psg.com> wrote:
>> I think we need to acknowledge that there will always be signing
> < from a conversation with a friend wiser than i >
> the problem is that we are going through a deployment phase where there
> is little penalty for sloppy server ops because so few are validating.
> patching over this to be more tolerant of sloppy server ops is going in
> the wrong direction. we need to think about how to make good server ops
> the easy path:
> o less breakage prone protocols
> o less breakage prone implementations
> o easing fast repair if breakage is known
> o detecting and reporting more aggressively
> o blah blah blah
> i.e. put that gun back in your hand
I like that line of thinking. Very nicely put, and it makes me reconsider my earlier thinking that NTAs will be useful to someone for ever.
However, I'm still not convinced that the right answer is not to standardise, or not to write up a BCP, for reasons of "if we write about this, people will do it for ever".
We can't predict how long this deployment phase will last, and it seems weird to assume that standardisation has no value over that unknown period. As a zone publisher, I would very much like to know how people are consuming my data. It seems more likely that I can have that insight if there is consistency in the way it is done.
When there is sufficient validation in the world that the support costs of signing errors shift from validator operators to zone publishers, it seems reasonable to predict that any words on NTAs will become useless naturally, on their own. That seems far more likely than the outcome where validator operators continue to deploy NTAs (at their own cost) for no reason.
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