[dns-operations] Why would an MTA issue an ANY query instead of an MX query?
vjs at rhyolite.com
Tue Jun 12 01:46:52 UTC 2012
> From: Chris Adams <cmadams at hiwaay.net>
> Once upon a time, Mark Andrews <marka at isc.org> said:
> > If we have Attacker -> CPE -> Auth -> CPE -> Target why isn't the CPE
> > returning answers from its cache?
> Most of the CPE just run a DNS proxy (e.g. dnsmasq on Linux-based
> boxes), not a full cache. Even if they ran a cache, the attack would
> still be CPE->Target (just not going to another server in-between). It
Why aren't ISPs blocking UDP source port 53 to the core under their
old no-servers-for-consumers term of service?
What is the common consumer ISP current practice for TCP port 25
at the ISP/core boundary? If it is one of the many old flavors of
blocking (e.g. always, prior arrangement, "business service"), why
can't it be applied to UDP port 53?
How many consumers would object if their "modems" can't answer or
perhaps even hear UDP port 53 from the outer Internet?
In other words, as with port 25, why must the rest of the Internet
subsidize some often very big outfits by dealing with abuse that the
outfits could deal with or at least contain within their own networks?
Why not a blacklist/ACL/whatever similar to Spamhaus' PBL for TCP
port 25? For that matter, why not apply the PBL to UDP port 53 on the
grounds that IP addresses that should never be seen sending email also
never need outside DNS service?
Of course, blocking consumer port 53 would not be a panacea, but
it might reduce the proxies available for abuse.
Vernon Schryver vjs at rhyolite.com
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