[dns-operations] DNS ANY requests from Amazon?
vjs at rhyolite.com
Tue Dec 18 16:22:33 UTC 2012
> From: Paul Vixie <paul at redbarn.org>
> On 12/18/2012 9:12 AM, Dobbins, Roland wrote:
> > The 'application-aware firewall' will collapse from state-table
> > exhaustion, however, so this likely isn't a very good idea.
> i don't think that follows. RRL is designed in a way that keeps state
> manageably finite.
State tables for some application-aware filtering can be smaller than
for filtering ICMP Echo-requests, TCP SYNs, or other trivial "applications".
If your application falls over at X requests/second, then it might not
matter that your firewall state table is exhaustd at 2X requests/second.
The BIND RRL state table design limit is supposed to be above the
limit for the DNS server itself, but that's an untested regime.
I think the recent NSD RRL code answered that issue by using a
large, fixed size hash table and tolerating false positives.
> in speaking to the cloudshield folks and learning
> more about "packetC" i think RRL can be done as part of a really smart
> front end firewall.
How would it filter requests for <random>.example.com without resolving
<random>.example.com to know if the response would be an NXDOMAIN
or wildcard answer the same as too many others?
You could assume that example.com has at most N subdomains, and that
all <random>.example.com after the first (or recent) N would get
NXDOMAIN, wildcard, or referral answers from the server behind the
filter, but that sounds likely to have false positives.
Vernon Schryver vjs at rhyolite.com
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