[dns-operations] Limiting DNSSEC-based amplification attacks (Was: Weird TXT record
rick.jones2 at hp.com
Fri Jun 24 23:22:20 UTC 2011
On 06/24/2011 04:15 PM, David Conrad wrote:
> On Jun 24, 2011, at 11:49 AM, Rick Jones wrote:
>> That depends on how reasonable/legitimate it is felt to toss the
>> baby of a non-caching resolver talking to an authoritative server
>> out with the bathwater of an attack.
> I'm curious: can you point to a non-caching resolver with non-trivial
> deployment? (Not denying they exist, honestly curious).
I was thinking more along the lines of an end-system pointed directly at
an authoritative server and probably should have said so. I probably had
"resolver library" in my brain while I was typing. Though perhaps in an
"operational" context that is something that is indeed either
"prohibited" or "really, Really, REALLY discouraged."
the ever fun distinctions between "can," "may," and "should."
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