[dns-operations] Source code to identify the fake DNS packets from China Re: Odd behaviour on one node in I root-server (facebook, youtube & twitter)

Hauke Lampe lampe at hauke-lampe.de
Fri Apr 9 09:54:49 UTC 2010


John Kristoff wrote:
> David Dagon <dagon at cc.gatech.edu> wrote:
> 
>>    a) Entire CIDRs (large ones: /16s, etc.) in China are open
>>       recursive, at least for qnames matching those three strings.
> 
> They wouldn't be open recursive then, they'd effectively be claiming
> authority, either implicitly or explicitly.

I used DNS traceroute to get a better view on those fake answers.

Example:
  hping2 -T -n -2 -p 53 -E query-twitter.dns -d 34 123.123.123.123
(example payload attached or at
https://www.hauke-lampe.de/linkedstuff/query-twitter.dns)

A few hops across the network border, volleys of forged answers begin to
appear. The query packets are not dropped, though, as I see "TTL
exceeded" messages all the way to the destination host.

So, a DNSSEC-signed answer should eventually make it back to the
initiator, if the listener hadn't already closed down after the first
unsigned reply matched the query's QID.



Hauke.
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