[dns-operations] Delegation checking (was: Re: Some DNSSEC trivia)

Mark Andrews Mark_Andrews at isc.org
Wed Jan 9 21:27:22 UTC 2008


> On Wed, Jan 09, 2008 at 11:05:49AM -0800, Jo Rhett wrote:
> 
> > >registries attempt to enforce this rule without the ability to notify
> > >registrants that their names are going dark.
> > 
> > People keep saying this, but the registration agreement as far back  
> > at 1993 (earliest I have) says that it's the registrant's  
> > responsibility to keep their contact information up to date.
> 
> That doesn't matter.  Registries aren't allowed to contact the
> registrants directly.  They have to go through the registrars.

	So?  Have them go through the registrar!  They get 21 days
	less whatever the registrar takes to forward the notice.
	Given that that could be down to as little as 1 second I
	don't think that will be a problem.

	Dear Client
		We have recieved the following notice from the
	XXXX registry that they intend to remove the following
	records from the XXXX zone on <date>.

		<record list>

	Please find attached the report from XXXX registry indicating
	what is required to be done to prevent this.  Please contact
	us on
	
		contact details

	if you wish help in understanding the report.

	Registrar

		<report>

> This
> isn't that surprising: retailers don't like retail customers to be
> talking to wholesalers generally.  So if the registry performs an
> action on a domain, and it causes the domain to go dark, there is the
> potential of the registrant quite correctly complaining that s/he
> wasn't informed of the action by the registry.
> 
> This is the reason, I expect (but IANAL, &c.) that ICANN's pages and
> just about every registry's tech support will tell registrants to talk to the
> ir
> registrar about problems _first_: the registrar is supposed to be the
> only point of contact between the DNS and the registrant.
> 
> I understand why people of a technical bent think the above state of
> affiars is inefficient and prone to needless points of failure.  But
> if you look at it as a piece of social engineering designed to work
> around an old state of affairs (a single registry company with control
> over several important TLDs, and anxiety on the part of the community
> about same), it makes a certain amount of sense.  
> 
> A
> 
> -- 
> Andrew Sullivan                         204-4141 Yonge Street
> Afilias Canada                        Toronto, Ontario Canada
> <andrew at ca.afilias.info>                              M2P 2A8
> jabber: ajsaf at jabber.org                 +1 416 646 3304 x4110
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-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
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PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: Mark_Andrews at isc.org



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